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The Medusean Eye in Thomas Hardy
L’œil méduséen chez Thomas Hardy
Annie Ramel
EDITOR'S NOTE
This article is being published jointly by FATHOM and the Hardy Review as part of a
collaborative work.
1 The eye in Thomas Hardy’s fiction often appears as the “evil eye”, an eye full of voracity,
endowed with the Medusean power to petrify and to kill. An article written jointly by
Phillip Mallett and Jacqueline Dillion offers a brilliant analysis of “the evil eye” in The
Return of  the  Native,  relating it  to the superstition known in Dorset  as  “overlooking”
(Dillion & Mallett; see also Dillion 2016, and F.E. Hardy 268-269). I too have explored the
question of the evil eye, mostly in Far from the Madding Crowd and The Return of the Native,
in several articles (Ramel 2010a, 9, 26; Ramel 2010b, 91-92), and in my book on Hardy
(Ramel 2015, 101-103). I fully agree with the reading provided by my two colleagues, but I
tend  to  view  things  in  a  slightly  different  perspective,  oriented  by  Lacanian
psychoanalysis. Therefore I shall try in this article to bring something new to the debate
on “overlooking”, and throw some light on the questions raised by the weird power of
“the evil eye” in Hardy’s fiction.
 
1. The eye and the gaze
2 One point on which I (slightly) differ from my colleagues’ analysis is the positive value
they give to the “face-to-face encounter”, the “shared humanity” and “ethical
obligations” that go with it1. Indeed in Lacan’s perspective, there can be no absolute face-
to-face encounter, because structurally speaking “you never look at me from the place
where I see you”, and conversely “what I look at is never what I wish to see” (Lacan 1986,
103)2. If I saw what I really wish to see, that would mean reaching the object of my desire,
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that  is  to say putting an end to desire and thus to life.  If  the Other saw me at  the
innermost point from which I see him, such an intrusion would be deadly. Tess, as a sun-
ray peers under her eye-lids and wakes her on Salisbury Plain (Hardy 1991, 381), is the
victim of such an effraction. The gaze of the Other enters her and thus condemns her to
death. As Joseph Hillis Miller writes:
The sun is in this novel, as in tradition generally, the fecundating male source, a
principle of life, but also a dangerous energy able to pierce and destroy, as Tess, at
the end of the novel, lying on the stone of sacrifice at Stonehenge, after her brief
period of happiness with Angel, is wakened, just before her capture, by the first
rays of the morning sun which penetrate under her eyelids (Miller 1982, 122).
3 The sun-beam, here, symbolizes the gaze of the Other that enters her, representing the
social and Symbolic order that sentences her to death. On the contrary, in the non-tragic
sub-plot of The Return of the Native, Thomasin is shielded from the Other’s gaze by Venn,
who  has  taken  care  to  hang  all  the  drapery  in  his possession  around  her  couch
(supposedly to keep her from any contact with the red material of his trade). Yet the
invasive light of the lantern threatens to creep under her eye-lids when Mrs Yeobright is
allowed into the van and shown the sleeping girl. One thing is sure: “she was not made to
be looked at thus”, and the reddleman “cast his eyes aside with a delicacy which well
became him” (Hardy 1990, 36). The girl is protected from the “watchful intentness” (4) of
gazers.
4 The Lacanian concept of “object-gaze” (objet-regard, often translated as “gaze qua object”)
is needed here to understand the fundamental dissymmetry between seeing and being
seen. Sartre had posited a reciprocity between seeing the Other and being seen by him3;
Lacan, on the contrary, argued that there is a split between the eye, which is on the side
of the subject, and the gaze, on the side of the object, that is to say on the side of the
Other. Why this lack of coincidence? Why this unbridgeable gap? Because of subjective
division, which means that the self is divided between itself and the semblance it shows
to the world, “the paper tiger it shows to the other” (Lacan 1986, 107). Access to the Other
is always missed, the wall of semblances divides the subject from the object of his desire,
as the French poet Louis Aragon knew very well before Lacan developed his theory of the
gaze:
In vain your image comes to meet me
And does not enter me where I am who only shows it
Turning towards me you can find
On the wall of my gaze only your dreamt-of shadow.
I am that wretch comparable with mirrors
That can reflect but cannot see
Like them my eye is empty and like them inhabited
By your absence which makes it blind.4
5 Blind, that is what every human being is, fundamentally: Lacan argues that the Biblical
words “they have eyes that they might not see” speak some truth about the “antinomic way”
between the two terms involved in the scopic field: the eye and the gaze.
6 A few words may be necessary here about the gaze as distinct from the eye, the gaze of
the Other: Lacan’s point is that, even before I start looking at the world around us, I am
being looked at from everywhere: “I see only from one point, but in my existence I am
looked at from all sides” (Lacan 1986, 72). Looked at, but not seen – for the Other’s gaze
cannot  reach  me.  The  example  he  gives  is  the  sardine-tin  which  he  remembers  a
fisherman pointed out to him when, as a young man, he was sailing with him in Brittany.
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The man exclaimed: “You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it does not see you!” (95).
Lacan kept asking himself questions about those words because, he says, “if what Petit-
Jean said to me, namely, that the can did not see me, had any meaning, it was because in a
sense, it was looking at me all the same. It was looking at me at the level of the point of
light, the point at which everything that looks at me is situated” (95). The sardine tin here
presentifies that point which he calls the “object-gaze”: the point from which the Other
looks at me, prior to my looking back at him. It was from the memory of that scene that
he deduced the object-gaze.
7 For this, Lacan is indebted to Merleau-Ponty and his idea of the visibility of things in his
Phenomenology of Perception:
The lighting directs my gaze and causes me to see the object, so that in a sense it
knows and sees the object. If I imagine a theatre with no audience in which the
curtain rises upon illuminated scenery, I have the impression that the spectacle is
in itself visible or ready to be seen, and that the light which probes the back and
foreground,  accentuating  the  shadows  and  permeating  the  scene  through  and
through, realizes before us some kind of vision. (Merleau-Ponty 278)
8 Commenting on this passage and its influence on Lacan as he developed his theory of the
gaze, Jacques-Alain Miller writes:
This is about a supplementary gaze which is always there – to take up Merleau-
Ponty’s  example –  and which is  contained in visibility  itself.  In addition to that
vision which another may have of me, there is the supplementary gaze of the Other,
of the hidden Other. One may glimpse it when the light not only offers a field of
visibility but also, simultaneously, focuses on a luminous spot which may figure the
gaze, which incarnates for a moment the all-seeing gaze of the big Other5.
9 What this analysis brings out is that Lacan’s object-gaze is the gaze of the big Other.
Should that evanescent spot, briefly illuminated and glimpsed, become a fixture in the
field of vision, then the subject could be assigned only one position, that of paranoia:
under the gaze of a malevolent Big Other/Brother.
10 It is essential to understand that the normal subjective position is not that of paranoia:
the Other may look at me, but does not see me. Thomasin may be threatened by the intrusive
gaze of watchers as she sleeps in the reddleman’s van, but she remains unharmed by that
“watchful intentness”. Visibility is no more than a potentiality. The object-gaze is but an
evanescent point that may be briefly glimpsed, not a permanent all-seeing eye. Lacan
defined the gaze as the “object” of the scopic drive, as one of the forms assumed by objet
petit a6. From which one may infer that the object-gaze, like objet petit a,  is an object
which is forever missing, “a pure deficit in the symbolic order that does not have any
imaginary protrusion to fill it out […] a vacuum, sucking other objects into its place”
(Kaye 56). It is felt as an absence rather than as a presence, it is “extracted” from our
reality.  Its  “extraction”,  normally  effected  by  symbolic  castration,  is  what  gives
coherence to our reality:
Lacan pointed out that the consistency of our “experience of reality” depends on
the exclusion of what he calls the objet petit a from it: in order for us to have normal
“access  to  reality”,  something  must  be  excluded,  “primordially  repressed”.  In
psychosis, this exclusion is undone: the object (in this case, the gaze or voice) is
included in reality,  the outcome of which, of  course,  is  the disintegration of our
“sense of reality”, the loss of reality. (Žižek 1996, 91)
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2. The Medusean eye in Hardy’s fiction
11 The best illustration that can be given to make all this clear is the one used by Lacan
himself: the anamorphosis in Holbein’s famous painting, The Ambassadors7 (see comment
in Ramel 2015, 85-86 & 89). But let us now turn to Hardy, who sometimes uses spatial
constructions that “extract” the object-gaze, in likeness to the effect produced by The
Ambassadors. In Far from the Madding Crowd, the presence / absence of the object-gaze is
felt from the beginning: immediately after the sheep have fallen off the edge of the cliff,
Oak  looks  down into  the  precipice,  then  shifts  his  gaze  to  survey  the  whole  scene.
Something on the outer margin of the pit catches his eye, it is a pond which looks like “a
dead man’s eye”. But the eye – the gaze of the Other – is not staring Oak in the face, it is
“attenuated” by a particular construction of space:
By the outer margin of the pit was an oval pond, and over it hung the attenuated
skeleton of a chrome-yellow moon which had only a few days to last—the morning
star dogging her on the left hand. The pool glittered like a dead man’s eye, and as
the world awoke a breeze blew, shaking and elongating the reflection of the moon
without breaking it, and turning the image of the star to a phosphoric streak upon
the water (Hardy 1986, 33).
12 The frontal view of the “dead man’s eye” is avoided by the pond having been placed on
the edge of the scene – like Holbein’s hollow bone –, on the frame of the picture.8 The
pond is “oval”, as if distorted by the gaze of the onlooker, who looks “awry” to see it. At
the beginning of the description, death is figured by the moon as a “skeleton” – a memento
mori, reminding Oak of the vanity of terrestrial things, as it only has a few more days to
last. The skeleton is “attenuated” because the moon is on the wane, but the adjective also
suggests that the horror is somehow screened, kept at a distance. Then we are shown the
pond as a dead eye, and the “skeleton” of the moon comes to be reflected on the surface
of the water. Death is now but a reflection, some object being interposed between its
horror and the onlooker’s eye. The breeze which starts blowing shakes and “elongates”
the reflection of the moon, turning it into a “phosphoric streak upon the water” – an
image which conveys the idea of some will-o’-the-wisp exhaled from the phosphorus of
skeletons.  In that uncanny object,  characterized by its  “particular stretching” (Hardy
1986,  87),  by  its  “pulsatile”,  “spread  out”,  uncertain  quality  (89),  we  recognize  the
“anamorphic ghost” that Lacan writes about, the death’s head which looks at you from its
empty sockets in Holbein’s Ambassadors, and gives figure to the unrepresentable object-
gaze.
13 Hardy’s talent here lies in the construction of a picture that both shows the object-gaze
and  excludes  it  from  the  visual  field:  there  is  “more  than  meets  the  eye”  in  the
anamorphosis, the split between the eye and the gaze is represented. To this scene one
should oppose the passage in which Boldwood receives the Valentine card, whose effect is
the exact reverse of that of anamorphosis. First, the card is a little surplus object – an
incongruous thing which Bathsheba does not know what to do with, until she decides to
send it to Boldwood, the only man who never looks at her. The Valentine finds its way to
Boldwood’s parlour, where it is placed on the wings of an eagle surmounting the time-
piece on the mantel-shelf. The feminine has thus intruded into the home of the hardened
bachelor –  the  feminine as  enigmatic,  unrepresentable9,  radically  Other,  especially  to
such a man as Boldwood. The alien, incongruous object then starts to exert a fascination
on him: “Here the bachelor’s gaze was continually fastening itself till the large red seal
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became as a blot of blood on the retina of his eye” (Hardy 1986, 80). The red seal enters
Boldwood’s eye until it turns into a bloodstain on his retina, as if the wax and the blood
on the retina became one and the same substance. Boldwood’s eye looking steadfastly at
the red seal becomes the thing it is looking at, while the red seal becomes the eye staring at
it. The split between the eye and the gaze is annuled: the gaze of the Other has entered
Boldwood at the very point from which he sees. The Valentine has become Boldwood’s
unheimlich double,  and its  voice,  which orders  him to  marry the anonymous sender,
logically becomes one with Boldwood’s own voice, as the farmer repeats its injunction:
“‘Marry me,’ he said aloud” (81). Boldwood conflates the enunciation of the Valentine and
his own.
14 We should also note that the construction of space in this scene is different from that of
anamorphosis. We have seen that the Valentine is first placed on the mantel-shelf. Later,
when Boldwood goes to bed, he moves the Valentine to the corner of the looking-glass,
sticking it in the frame of the glass. So far, the “insistent red seal” has been staring at
Boldwood from the periphery of his visual space. Suddenly Boldwood’s attention is drawn
towards his own reflection in the mirror; the eye is no longer peripheral, it has migrated
to the centre of the mirror: “The solemn and reserved yeoman […] caught sight of his
reflected features,  wan in expression,  and insubstantial  in form.  He saw how closely
compressed was his mouth, and that his eyes were wide-spread and vacant” (Hardy 1986,
81). It is Boldwood’s death’s-head which now appears in the looking-glass, staring him in
the  face  from the  eyes  of  a  dead  man,  which  Boldwood  recognizes  as  his  own  yet
perceives as totally strange. This uncanny encounter between Boldwood and his double
reflected in the mirror cannot be reduced to a symmetrical relation for, as Žižek argues,
the double is not just an imaginary other, the same as me: it is an image of “radical
otherness”; “the double is the same as me, yet totally strange; his sameness all the more
accentuates his  uncanniness”.  Žižek goes a step further by arguing that  “at  its  most
fundamental, the double embodies the phantom-like Thing in me […] In my double, I
don’t simply encounter myself (my mirror image), but first of all what is ‘in me more than
myself’ […] a pure substance of enjoyment exempted from the circuit of generation and
corruption” (Žižek 2001, 125). The double, writes Žižek, is “the double qua Thing” (126). 
15 A few words are necessary here to clarify Žižek’s formula, “the double qua Thing”. For
Lacan “The Thing” (das Ding in Freudian terms) stands for what is most interior to the
psyche (“in me more than myself”), and for what is most exterior to it. Lacan says it is
“extimate” to the subject (Lacan 2008, 87-88)10. The Thing is “the absolute Other of the
subject, that one is supposed to find again” (63) – as such, it is the primordial object of
desire, the irreplaceable “object-cause” that the subject craves for. At the same time, it is
a fantasy of perfect unity, where the subject dissolves into the Other and becomes one
with it. So that “The Thing” is both what is most alien to the subject, and what represents
his innermost being. Exactly like the image which the mirror sends back to Boldwood,
which is both his own self and a figure of radical Otherness. The Thing is fantasized as the
origin, the primeval unity11 to which every human being aspires to return, but never
reaches – indeed Lacan equates it with “the maternal thing” (81)12. As the ultimate object
of desire, the Thing is a figure of perfect jouissance – but reaching it would put an end to
desire and to life.
16 To what extent is Žižek’s analysis relevant to Boldwood facing his double in the mirror?
In  particular,  can it  be  argued that  “the  double  qua Thing”  is to  Boldwood “a  pure
substance of enjoyment”? When the red wax and the man’s retina become consubstantial,
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is that jouissance? For one thing, the Valentine with its red seal, drawing Boldwood like a
magnet, indicates that Boldwood’s desire is involved in a scene full of sexual undertones –
for  instance  the  word  “curve”  is  used  with  reference  to  handwriting  but  also  to  a
woman’s body (see Ramel 2016, 7-8). What desire, then? A desire for a particular woman?
No, for Boldwood does not even know who wrote the Valentine. Desire is kindled here by
the mystery of the origin of the anonymous letter, as if the fascination were caused by the
opacity  of  what  Pascal  Quignard  calls  the  “sexual  night”  (see  Quignard) –  the
unfathomable mystery of the womb wherein everyone fancies lies his/her origin. Indeed
the word “origin” occurs three times on two pages (Hardy 1886, 80-81). And we know that
Boldwood will seek the “original” of the woman who wrote the message, and pursue the
unique,  primordial  object-cause  of  his  desire  with  unflinching  determination.
Undoubtedly, it is “The Thing” that Boldwood is concerned with. But why then should his
vision of the woman writing give way to the vision of his own death’s head reflected in
the mirror? Why is the image of the alluring red seal overturned to reveal the horror
lurking just  behind?  Here  Hardy speaks  some truth about  human desire  at  its  most
fundamental: for the drive towards the Thing is another name for the death drive. Death
is the fate that awaits whoever attempts a backward course to his/her origin, but it is also
his / her truest and most intimate desire. So after all Žižek’s theorizing about the double
is perfectly relevant here: the double is indeed “the double qua Thing”, “a pure substance
of enjoyment” which, one might say, is “in Boldwood more than himself”. The scene, in
its subtle mixing of sexuality and the death-drive, is definitely about jouissance in the
Lacanian sense of the term.
17 If the double stands for radical Otherness, the Otherness of the Thing, it logically ensues
that the eyes in the mirror embody the gaze of the Other – that is to say, in Lacanian
words, the object-gaze. The same inference can be made about the red seal turned into a
mirror-image of the eye staring at it13. And also about Boldwood’s own eyes. That idea is
developed by Žižek in a passage about the double:
When I find myself face to face with my double, when I “encounter myself” among
the objects,  when “I  myself”  qua subject  appear “out  there”,  what  am I  at  that
precise moment as the one who looks at it, as a witness to myself? Precisely the
gaze  qua object:  the  horror  of  coming face  to  face  with  my double  is  that  this
encounter reduces me to the object-gaze. (Žižek 2001, 126)
18 At this point, when the eye and the Other’s gaze coincide, “when the gaze qua object is no
longer the elusive blind spot in the field of the visible but is included in this field, one
meets  one’s  own  death”.  For  indeed  “’seeing  oneself  looking’  [se  voir  voyant],
unmistakably stands for death” (Žižek 1996, 94). In the uncanny encounter between a
man and his double (Doppelgänger), “the double strangely seems always to look askew,
never to return our gaze by looking straight into our eyes – the moment he were to do it,
our life would be over” (94). The die is cast for Boldwood from now on: when the eye and
the gaze meet  in an awful  conflation,  the gaze turns Medusean,  and only death can
ensue – Boldwood will not actually die, since he is reprieved, but he is symbolically dead
(“he walked the world no more”, Hardy 1986, 290).
19 Thus it appears that the “evil eye” is the form assumed by the object-gaze when it ceases
to  be  a  vacillating,  evanescent  presence /  absence.  In  The  Return  of  the  Native,  the
organization of space at the beginning of the novel is careful to show the split between
the eye and the gaze14, in particular in chapter III (“The Custom of the Country”) where
the flames of the bonfire on Egdon Heath throw an unstable light on the individuals
standing round and produce an effect comparable to that of anamorphosis. But rather
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than dwelling on this, I will focus on the scene in which Mrs Yeobright is literally killed
by Eustacia’s gaze, in a mortal face to face encounter. Clym’s mother, wanting to make
peace with her son, knocks at the door of his cottage, but Clym is asleep and does not
hear anything, while Eustacia is in the compromising company of Wildeve. Eustacia does
not at first open the door, so Mrs Yeobright walks away, thinking her son rejects her. But
she has seen something that will ultimately kill her, she has indeed been “overlooked”
(see Dillion & Mallett): “I have seen […] a woman’s face looking at me through a window-
pane”  (Hardy 1990,  288).  In  her  exchange  on  the  heath  with  a  little  boy –  Jimmy
Nunsuch –, she explains to him that she has seen a “bad sight”, to which the boy replies:
“once when I went to Throope Great Pond to catch effets I seed myself looking up at
myself, and I was frightened and jumped back like anything” (288). The “bad sight” for
Jimmy was clearly a case of “seeing himself looking” – and we know by now that such an
experience “unmistakably stands for death”. The parallel made by the narrative between
the “bad sight” encountered by Jimmy and that seen by Mrs Yeobright encourages us to
believe that in the window of Clym’s cottage, what Mrs Yeobright has seen is not just her
daughter-in-law refusing to let her in, but her own mirror-image, her true double – such
a reading being of course perfectly consonant with Freudian analyses focusing on the
mother’s desire to supplant her daughter-in-law and have her son all to herself. A few
pages further, after she has been stung by an adder and carried into a hut, so that her
wound might be anointed by the liquid fat of an adder, she finds herself facing the animal
about to be sacrificed. In a mirror-relation, the eye of the creature meets her own eye:
“The live adder regarded the assembled group with a sinister look in its small black eye,
and the beautiful brown and jet pattern, on its back seemed to intensify with indignation.
Mrs Yeobright saw the creature, and the creature saw her: she quivered throughout, and
averted her eyes” (297). Averting her eyes – like the man attempting to look askew to
avoid looking straight into the eyes of his double – is to no avail. What is repeated here is
the deadly face-to-face relation between her and Eustacia through the window-pane: the
“small black eye” of the adder, “like a villainous sort of black currant” (297), which the
villagers fear might “ill-wish” them (298), is of course a duplicate of Eustacia’s “wild dark
eyes” known for their “ill-wishing” power (48). The “scarlet speck” which appears on Mrs
Yeobright’s foot (296-297) unmistakably identifies her with Eustacia who, in an earlier
scene, showed to Clym “a scarlet little puncture”, “a bright red spot” on her round white
arm (186-187). This confirms my interpretation of Mrs Yeobright’s “bad sight”: what she
has seen in the window-frame is her own double, she has seen herself looking at herself.
Like Žižek’s Doppelgänger, she finds herself “at the very point of a pure gaze”15. In this
conflation of eye and gaze, she can only meet her death. The “evil eye” that has killed
her,  the  Medusa-like  gaze  of  her  daughter-in-law,  is  no  other  than  the  object-gaze
coinciding with her own eye.
20 Another mirror-scene takes place a little later. Johnny Nunsuch has just revealed to Clym
the circumstances of his mother’s death. Clym comes home in a rage and arrives behind
Eustacia, who is standing before a looking-glass:
[…] when he opened the door she was standing before the looking glass  in her
nightdress, the ends of her hair gathered into one hand, with which she was coiling
the whole mass round her head, previous to beginning toilette operations. She was
not a woman given to speaking first at a meeting, and she allowed Clym to walk
across in silence, without turning her head. He came behind her, and she saw his
face in the glass. It was ashy, haggard, and terrible. Instead of starting towards him
in sorrowful surprise […] she remained motionless, looking at him in the glass. And
while  she  looked  the  carmine  flush  with  which  warmth  and  sound  sleep  had
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suffused her cheeks and neck dissolved from view, and the deathlike pallor in his
face flew across into hers. He was close enough to see this, and the sight instigated
his tongue.
‘You know what is the matter,’ he said huskily. ‘I see it in your face’ (Hardy 1990,
328).
21 Clym has caught in the mirror-image of Eustacia what normally eludes the eye’s grasp,
the object-gaze which is “more than meets the eye” (Žižek 2001, 127). The logic of the
double prevails here: the subject’s eye and the Other’s gaze coincide, Eustacia sees herself
looking, and Clym sees her seeing herself looking. In this uncanny encounter, Clym sees
Eustacia’s eye looking at her mirror-image, and Eustacia sees Clym’s gaze peering into the
mirror and seeing her at the very point from which she sees. The mirror has indeed
become a looking glass, which both reflects and sees – unlike Aragon’s “mirror”, and unlike
the mirror in Lacan’s  mirror-stage.  Clym knows that she knows that he knows that she
knows, etc.  Clym’s eye here is not blind, not empty, it is inhabited by Eustacia’s real
presence. Such an eye/gaze is Medusean: Eustacia does not turn, her head, she remains
motionless, petrified. Both Clym and Eustacia seem to have been turned to stone. 
22 So Boldwood and Eustacia  are both confronted to “looking-glasses” inhabited by the
presence of the Other. “The Withered Arm” (Hardy 1988, 52-78) stages a similar mirror-
relation between Rhoda and Gertrude, “the supplanted woman” (Rhoda) having found
her double in Gertrude, the wife of Farmer Lodge16.  In the attempt to find a cure for
Gertrude’s  “withered  arm”,  Rhoda  and  Gertrude  visit  conjuror  Trendle,  who  shows
Gertrude a glass filled with a strange mixture – in fact a mixture of water and egg-white –
where, he says, she might be able to see an image of the “enemy” causing her trouble.
Rhoda,  who has been told to wait outside,  sees all  the proceedings,  for the door has
remained ajar, and then the glass is brought close to the window. She is “overlooking” the
scene, indeed she is the focaliser in the passage, which is important. What does Gertrude
see in the glass? The glass functions as a “looking-glass” – in the sense of “a glass used for
looking” –, but also as a mirror, for it sends to Gertrude an image of Rhoda, the other
woman looking at her in the glass. But a very special mirror, which is also a “looking
glass” – without a hyphen –, a glass looking at Gertrude, now exposed to the gaze of the
Other – the other woman, the “enemy” –, that is to say to the object-gaze. Indeed “the
opaline hue of the egg fluid” staring Gertrude in the face is strongly reminiscent of “the
uneasy depthless white” of a blind man’s eyes, which, according to Žižek is “an exemplary
case” of the gaze qua object: “The exemplary case of the gaze qua object is a blind man’s
eyes, i.e. eyes which do not see (we experience the gaze qua object when a partner in
conversation suddenly takes off his black glasses, exposing us to the uneasy depthless
white of his eyes”) (Žižek 2001, 117)17. It is as though the uneasy mixture of egg-white and
water had turned into the white of an eye, an eye without a pupil18 – a figure given to the
unspecularisable object-gaze. At the same time, the “looking glass” also functions as a
mirror held to Gertrude, for as she sees her double in the mirror, she also sees herself.
She  sees  herself  seeing  herself  seeing.  As  for  Rhoda,  she  sees  herself  being  seen by
Gertrude, and she sees herself seeing herself being seen by Gertrude, for the specular
relation implies reversibility – indeed the same pallor creeps over the faces of the two
women. The gaze of the Other “enters” them, reaches them at the innermost point from
which they see. The shapeless, turbid image reflected by the looking-glass is “extimate”
to Gertrude/Rhoda: both intimate, and alien to them, like Žižek’s Döppelganger, and like
Boldwood’s mirror-image. The villagers are right to believe that Gertrude’s misfortunes
have been caused by her being “overlooked” (Hardy 1988, 66): for when the eye and the
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gaze coincide – in popular superstitions and in works of fiction – the encounter is always
mortal. That is what tradition calls the “evil eye”.
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NOTES
1. Though  of  course  responding  to  the  other’s  gaze  is  essential  in  building  intersubjective
relations. Lacan’s “mirror-stage” provides the infant with a unified image of his/her self but also,
simultaneously,  introduces  him  to  social  relations  (i.e.  to  the  symbolic  world)  because  the
supporting role of other human beings (encouraging him to recognize himself/herself  in the
mirror-image) is an essential part in the process. The infant sees his/her own image and also sees
the supporting other looking at it and identifying him/her with it. 
2. The actual translation in the Peregrine Book (Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychanalysis,  translated  by  Alan Sheridan (1977)  from Le  Séminaire,  XI,  “Les  quatre  concepts
fondamentaux de la psychanalyse”, reprinted in Peregrine Books, London, 1986) is: “you never
look at me from the place from which I see you”, which does not make sense, and is erroneous – the
French being “jamais tu ne me regardes là où je te vois” (Lacan 1973, 95). I have taken the liberty of
correcting the translation.
3. For Sartre, the gaze is that which enables the subject to realize that the Other is also a subject:
“My fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my
permanent possibility of being seen by the Other” (Sartre 256). Lacan went along with Sartre in his
early seminars, his conception of the mirror-stage is perfectly consonant with such a view. It was
only in 1964 that he developed his own conception of the gaze as objet petit a and then took issue
with Sartre on this question (Lacan 1973, 84).
4. Lacan quotes this poem twice in The Seminar XI, first as an introduction to his second chapter,
“The  Freudian  Unconscious  and  ours”,  then  to  introduce  his  seventh  chapter  on
“Anamorphosis”:
Vainement ton image arrive à ma rencontre
Et ne m’entre où je suis qui seulement la montre
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Toi te tournant vers moi tu ne saurais trouver
Au mur de mon regard que ton ombre rêvée
Je suis ce malheureux comparable aux miroirs
Qui peuvent réfléchir mais ne peuvent pas voir
Comme eux mon œil est vide et comme eux habité
De l’absence de toi qui fait sa cécité
(Louis Aragon, Le Fou d’Elsa, “Contre-chant”, 1963, quoted and translated in Lacan 1986, 17).
5. “Il s’agit d’un regard supplémentaire qu’il y a toujours – pour reprendre l’exemple de Merleau-
Ponty – et qui est le regard contenu dans la visibilité même. Qu’en plus de la vision qu’un autre
peut avoir de moi, il y a le regard supplémentaire de l’Autre, de l’Autre caché. On peut percevoir
cela quand la lumière non seulement offre un champ de visibilité mais se concentre en même
temps sur un point lumineux qui peut avoir valeur de regard, qui incarne un moment le regard
omnivoyant du grand Autre” (Miller 2008, 103, my translation).
6. “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a” is the title of the second part of The Seminar XI, given by
Lacan in 1964. Lacan defines the gaze as an object, which he adds to the four drive objects
listed by Freud. The object-voice is another object added by Lacan, gaze and voice being
interrelated forms of objet a.
7. The  Ambassadors is  reproduced  on  the  front-cover  of  Lacan’s  XIth  Seminar.  See  chap. VII,
entitled “Anamorphosis”, 79-90. In Holbein's painting, the anamorphic object, the death’s head,
is “extracted" from the visual field by being placed at the bottom of the picture, where it is
distorted and unrecognizable. At first, all you see is some sort of cuttlebone, until an oblique gaze
allows you to catch a glimpse of the death’s head. 
8. J.B. Bullen has shown the “pictorial” quality of Hardy’s descriptions (Bullen 6). Liliane Louvel,
in  Poetics  of  the  Iconotext,  has  developed  the  concept  of  the  “painting-effect”  in  texts,  “an
illusionistic effect so powerful that painting seems to haunt the text despite the absence of any
direct reference to painting in general or to a particular painting” (Louvel 90).
9. “L’irreprésentable de la féminité” (“the unrepresentable of femininity”, André 263).
10. Lacan first introduced the word “extime” in his XVIth Seminar (Lacan 2006, 249).
11. Such primeval unity, conceived as anterior to subjective division, never existed: it is a mere
effect of language, posterior to symbolic castration (Braunstein 78-79).
12. “Well now, the step taken by Freud […] is to show that there is no Sovereign Good – that the
Sovereign Good, which is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden
good, and that there is no other good” (Lacan 2008, 85).
13. The red stain as a representation of the object-gaze should not surprise us, for Lacan has
argued that the first model of the gaze is the stain: “[…] le premier modèle du regard est la tache”
(Lacan 2001). The red stain as a figure of the object-gaze is the key-idea in my book on Thomas
Hardy, The Madder Stain (Ramel 2015). 
14. The tumulus from which Eustacia looks at Wildeve’s lit window through her telescope is some
distance away from the tumulus where she means to be reached by Wildeve’s gaze (she keeps her
private bonfire burning steadily there to attract his attention, Hardy 1990, 55).
15. “As  a  rule  one  focuses  on  the  horror  of  being  the  object  of  some  invisible,
unfathomable, panoptical gaze (the ‘someone-is-watching-me’ motif) – yet it is a far more
unbearable experience to find oneself at the very point of a pure gaze” (Žižek 2001, 126). 
16. Rhoda’s  boy stares  at  Gertrude,  as  if  he  “would read her  through and through”
(Hardy 1988, 54), and gives a full report to his mother, providing her with a mental image
of Mrs Lodge “that was realistic as a photograph” (57). A photograph that works as a
mirror-image, for what Rhoda seeks in it is her own image. Rhoda will  end up being
“wrinkled” (78) in perfect likeness to Gertrude. 
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17. In this Žižek is merely following Lacan: “Qu’est-ce qui nous regarde? Le blanc de l’oeil de
l’aveugle, par exemple” (Lacan 2004, 293). 
18. The pupil for Lacan is a structural “hole”, a blind spot which allows the subject to be “elided
as subject of the geometral plane” (Lacan 1986, 108), i.e. which maintains the split between eye
and gaze. 
ABSTRACTS
The eye in Thomas Hardy’s fiction is often felt as a menace, like the “oval pond” in Far from the
Madding Crowd, glittering “like a dead man’s eye”. The unblinking eye can be an “evil eye”, full of
voracity, endowed with a Medusean power, the power to petrify or to kill. Indeed eyes do kill in
Hardy’s stories: Mrs Yeobright is killed by the “bad sight” of her daughter-in-law looking at her
from a window and not opening the door – the “small black eye” of the live adder later regarding
her being a duplicate of Eustacia’s “ill-wishing” dark eyes. At what point does the gaze, which
normally  makes  manifest  the  “positive,  dynamic  and  productive  dimension  of  desire”  (Jane
Thomas, Thomas Hardy and Desire: Conceptions of the Self, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013,
back cover) turn Medusean? Jacques Lacan’s concept of the unspecularizable “object-gaze” will
help us to understand this, and throw a new light on the fictional use which Hardy made of “the
evil eye” – a superstition known in Dorset as “overlooking”.
L’œil dans la fiction de Thomas Hardy est souvent perçu comme menace : c'est la cas de l’étang
ovale éclairé par la lune qui luit “comme l'œil d'un mort” dans Far from the Madding Crowd. L’œil
fixe, qui ne cille pas, peut être “le mauvais œil”, plein de voracité, doué d’un pouvoir méduséen,
le pouvoir de pétrifier et de tuer. En vérité, l’œil tue dans la fiction de Hardy : Mrs Yeobright est
tuée par un “spectacle” au pouvoir maléfique (“a bad sight”), la vue de sa belle-fille qui la regarde
par une fenêtre et ne lui ouvre pas la porte – le “petit œil noir” de la vipère qui la regarde plus
tard n’étant autre qu’une réplique de l’œil noir de Eustacia, capable de jeter le mauvais sort. À
quel  moment  passe-t-on  du  regard  porteur  de  désir,  qui  en  rend  manifeste  la  dimension
“positive, dynamique et productive” (Jane Thomas, Thomas Hardy and Desire: Conceptions of the Self,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) au regard méduséen? Le concept lacanien de “l’objet-
regard” nous aidera à comprendre cela, et éclairera d’un jour nouveau l’utilisation fictionnelle
que  fait  Hardy  de  cette  superstition  connue  dans  le  Dorset  comme  “overlooking”  (“jeter  le
mauvais œil”).
INDEX
Keywords: evil eye, desire, gaze, gaze qua object, overlook, anamorphosis, double, mirror
oeuvrecitee Far from the Madding Crowd, Return of the Native (The), Withered Arm (The)
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